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Abstract 
The bedside diagnosis of vegetative and minimally conscious patients is extremely challenging 
and individual long-term outcome prediction remains difficult. State-of the art neuroimaging 
methods could help disentangling complex cases and offer new prognostic criteria. These 
methods could be divided into to three categories. First, the new anatomical MRI neuroimaging 
methods, like diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) or spectroscopy, and the passive functional 
imaging methods (looking at the brain‘s activation induced by external stimuli), could provide 
new diagnostic and prognostic markers. Second, neuroimaging methods based on active 
collaboration from the patient could help to detect clinically unnoticed signs of consciousness. 
Third, developments in brain-computer interfaces based on EEG, functional MRI or EMG offer 
communication possibilities in brain-damaged patients who cannot verbally or non-verbally 
express their thoughts or wishes. These new approaches raise important issues not only from a 
clinical and ethical perspective (i.e., patients‘ diagnosis, prognosis and management) but also 
from a neuroscientific standpoint, as they enrich our current understanding of the emergence and 





Acute brain injury, whether it is traumatic or anoxic can cause coma. Until fifty years ago, most 
comatose patient died (e.g., from apnea) or seldomly recovered but with cerebral deficit of 
varying severity. Coma outcome was improved following the invention of the artificial ventilator 
by Bjorn Ibsen in the 1950s which lead to the development of intensive care, and to the 
dissociation of cardiac, respiratory and brain function. Nowadays, although most patients recover 
from coma within the first days after the injury, some permanently lose all brainstem functions 
(brain death, i.e. irreversible coma with absent brainstem reflexes [24]), whereas others progress 
to ―wakeful unawareness‖, i.e. patients who ‗awaken‘ from coma (open their eyes spontaneously 
or on stimulation) but remain unaware of self or environment (show only reflex motor response), 
the vegetative state (VS) [18]. The latter either will not evolve anymore or will progress through 
different stages before fully or partly recovering consciousness (minimally conscious state, 
MCS). MCS patients show inconsistent but reproducible, limited but clearly discernible, 
evidence of awareness of self or environment [14]. There is yet another condition, the locked-in 
syndrome (LIS) [36],  in which the patient emerges from coma fully aware but unable to move or 
communicate, except by small eye movement. 
Consciousness has two main components: wakefulness and awareness (Figure 1). In normal 
physiological conditions, wakefulness and awareness are positively correlated (with the 
exception of rapid eye movement sleep). Patients in coma or anesthetized subjects are 
unconscious because they cannot be awakened. VS is a unique dissociated state of wakefulness 
without awareness (i.e., only motor reflexes can be observed). Wakefulness is supported by the 
function of the subcortical arousal systems in the brainstem and thalamus. Awareness is thought 
to be supported by the functional integrity of the cerebral cortex and its subcortical connections 
[23]. 
Nowadays, the clinical diagnosis of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) such as VS 
and MCS is based on the evaluation of motor activity and command following. This is extremely 
challenging because these patients are usually deprived of the capacity to make normal physical 
movements and may show limited attentional capacities. Furthermore, clinical studies have 
shown how difficult it is to differentiate reflex from voluntary movements (see [30] for review). 
Finally, aphasia, apraxia, and cortical deafness or blindness are other possible confounders. 
Therefore, recognizing the subtle difference between MCS and VS requires repeated evaluations 
by skilled examiners. Not surprisingly, the misdiagnosis rate between the two states is around 
40% [44]. 
The prognosis for survival and recovery from coma, VS, MCS or LIS is still difficult to establish 
at the individual level. Certain factors, however, increase the chances of recovery. The young age 
of the patient, a traumatic etiology and the short duration of the state are linked to a better 
outcome [1]. Additionally, patients who are MCS for one month after brain injury have better 
chances of recovery than patients who are VS one month post-injury. Patients who are vegetative 
one year (respectively, three months) following a traumatic (respectively, anoxic) injury have 
very few chances of recovery. Life expectancy of most vegetative patients varies between two 
and five years, very few patients stay more than 10 years in this state whereas the average 
survival time for LIS patients is about six years (+/- 4 years). However, some cases of recovery 
after many years have been reported [56] [25]. 
Advanced magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) methods and functional neuroimaging now offers 
the possibility to improve the measurement of the spread of a brain lesion and to directly 
measure the brain‘s activity, not only at rest or during passive stimulation, but also in response to 
commands. These methods could enhance new important steps in the continuum from coma to 
recovery of consciousness and offer new markers for improving prognosis. We will give here a 
brief overview of the clinical assessment of DOC through behavioral testing. Next, we expose 
the current developments in anatomical and functional neuroimaging methods which should help 
to define new diagnostic and prognostic markers. Active functional neuroimaging paradigms, 
where the patient must respond or pay attention to the stimuli, and which better define the 
boundary between VS and MCS are presented next. Then, we show how these methods could 
conduct to the neuroimaging of emergence. Finally, some important ethical considerations and 
future directions are discussed.  
Behavioral assessment 
While wakefulness is assessed by eye-opening (spontaneously or in response to stimulation), 
bedside assessment of awareness is more challenging. Awareness is a first-person perspective, 
and its clinical evaluation is limited to evaluating patients‘ motor responsiveness. To help 
clinicians, standardized bedside tools have been developed. The Glasgow coma scale (GCS) [48] 
remains the gold standard in coma. The GCS assesses eye opening and motor and verbal 
responsiveness. Some authors have disagreed that evaluation of spontaneous or stimulation –
induced opening of the eyes is sufficiently indicative of brain stem arousal system activity and 
have proposed coma scales that include brain stem reflexes like the Glasgow-Liège scale [9]. 
However, only the GCS has known a widespread use due to its short and simple administration. 
More sensitive scales are the Full Outline of Unresponsiveness (FOUR) [57], the Coma 
Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) [16],  and the Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM) [45]. The 
CRS-R [16] is a recent scale specifically developed to differentiate VS from MCS and which 
explicitly incorporates current diagnostic criteria. The basic structure of the CRS-R is similar to 
the GCS, but its subscales are much more detailed and also contain auditory, arousal and 
communication subscales. 
A consensus on how to practically assess some of the behavioral responses, which are used in 
these scales, is often missing. For example, there is no agreement on what stimulus to employ in 
the assessment of visual pursuit movements—often one of the first clinical signs heralding the 
transition from the vegetative to the minimally conscious state. Vanhaudenhuyse and colleagues 
[53] studied visual pursuit in 51 post-comatose patients comparing eye tracking of a moving 
object, person or mirror. They showed that more than a fifth of the minimally conscious patients 
with visual pursuit only showed eye tracking when studied by means of a moving mirror and not 
when studied by means of a moving object (i.e., the stimulus most frequently used in a routine 
neurological examination) or by means of a moving person. Other controversial clinical signs are 
the definition and clinical assessment of visual fixation, orientated motor responses to noxious 
stimuli, and blinking responses to visual threat. The latter was recently demonstrated as being 
present in about half of the patients who showed all the features typical of the VS [50]. The 
authors concluded it was not a reliable indicator of consciousness neither of recovery of 
consciousness. 
Neuroimaging diagnosis and prognosis markers  
Classical and newly developed neuroimaging methods have been proposed to probe the spread of 
changes in brain anatomy and residual brain function in DOC. These studies are tracking new 
diagnosis and prognosis markers employing four different methodological approaches. First, 
advanced anatomical imaging can assess not only changes in the brain‘s anatomy but also in the 
brain‘s chemical properties or functional connectivity. Second, PET studies detected global and 
regional changes in brain metabolism. Nowadays, global changes are also tracked with EEG. 
Third, event-related studies are probing different brain systems by means of auditory or 
somatosensory stimulation paradigms. These studies employ a hierarchical approach, starting 
with simple stimuli (leading to low-level local brain activation) to progressively more complex 
ones (leading to activation of a progressively wider network of cerebral areas reflecting higher 
cognitive processing). Fourth, the brain can be probed by a recently introduced approach known 
as ―default mode‖ or ―resting state‖ network assessments (which is not based on the brain‘s 
response to external stimulation but tracks functional connectivity in the ―thinking‖ resting 
brain).[7, 8, 52] 
Anatomy and anatomical connectivity 
Canonical MRI studies are limited to the study of the anatomical location of the lesion, while 
more advanced MRI methods, such as voxel-based volumetry or morphometry and spectroscopy 
enables, respectively, the objective quantification of changes in brain structure, and the 
measurement of metabolites such as N-acetyl-aspartate (a biomarker for neuronal integrity), 
choline (a marker for cell membrane turnover) and creatine (for cellular energetic function) (see  
[13]and [49] for review). Changes in anatomical connectivity can also be tracked through 
diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) [13]. This technique has already shed light on the mechanisms of 
recovery from the minimally conscious state, identifying axonal regrowth in the brain of a 
patient who emerged from a minimally conscious state after 19 years of silence [55]. 
Global activity 
PET and EEG have tracked global changes in brain function. PET imaging studies showed 
reduction in global metabolic activity of up to 50% of normal values in VS patients (Figure 1) 
[27, 28]. Similar global decreases in metabolic activity are observed in deep sleep and in 
anesthesia [31].  However, some well documented VS patients have shown close to normal 
global metabolic activity [39]. The EEG‘s bispectral index scale (BIS) and EEG-entropy 
measurements, two global EEG measures, have been developed to measure the depth of sedation 
in anesthesia [47, 54]  and tested with DOC patients. BIS values also gradually decrease during 
sleep [32] and when patients evolve to a coma or VS [41]. It was also shown to have prognostic 
value in DOC [41]. However, BIS is a nonspecific measure of consciousness and does not 
systematically differentiate MCS from VS patients at the individual level [42]. The EEG-entropy 
seems to offer similar results in DOC as does EEG-BIS monitoring (O. Gosseries, unpublished 
data).   
Functional neuroimaging 
Preserved cortical information processing capabilities in a given area or network can be assessed 
by employing hemodynamic measurements (such as blood flow PET or fMRI) or magneto-
electrical measurements of the brain (such as EEG or magnetoencephalography – MEG). In 
fMRI and PET studies, primary cortices still seem to activate in vegetative patients during 
external stimulation, whereas hierarchically higher-order multimodal association areas do not 
(reviewed in [15]). Similar results have been obtained with EEG evoked potential studies ([51] 
for review). Early components of event related potentials arising within 100 ms are related to 
activity in primary cortices. Later components (e.g. P3b, P600, contingent negative variation, 
readiness potential), seem related to the higher-order cognitive processing of the external stimuli.   
The auditory system is the most probed one in DOC - due to the facility to present the auditory 
stimuli and the possibility to have graded complexity of stimuli (ranging from simple sounds, to 
words, and sentences). Probing the visual system requires sustained eye opening and visual 
fixation which is often difficult to obtain in DOC patients. Somatosensory stimulation is easier 
but  does not permit administration of stimuli with graded complexity. Therefore, presentation of 
simple sounds, words, the patient‘s own name or sentences have been most often used in 
mismatch negativity, oddball paradigm or block-design paradigms [10, 20].  In patients in a 
MCS, auditory stimuli triggers higher-order cortical activity normally not observed in VS [5]. In 
the same line, auditory stimuli with emotional valence (such as infant cries or the patient‘s own 
name [29] or a narrative told by the patient‘s mother [40]) induce a much more widespread 
activation in patients in minimally conscious state than meaningless stimuli do. However the 
activation of higher order cortical processing or the appearance of a P300 is not enough to 
distinguish an individual VS patient from a MCS patient. EEG studies have reported that some 
VS patients might be capable of processing semantic stimuli, indicating some comprehension of 
meaning [19] or reported a P300 response to salient stimuli [35] . In other experiments with 
fMRI, VS patients exhibited activity in higher order areas similar to the activity observed in 
MCS patients and controls either while listening to their own name spoken by a familiar voice 
[12], or in a semantic ambiguity test [10]. These experiments indicate that content does matter 
when talking to a DOC patient. 
Similarly, during noxious stimulation, only the brainstem, the thalamus and the primary 
somatosensory cortex are activated in VS, and the latter is isolated and disconnected from the 
other brain areas [5, 26]. These findings support the idea that patients in a vegetative state do not 
perceive pain in the same manner as healthy people. In contrast to VS patients, MCS patients 
showed an activation pattern of the complete pain matrix very similar to that observed in healthy 
controls encompassing thalamus, primary and secondary somatosensory, frontoparietal, and 
anterior cingulate cortices and with a preserved functional connectivity between these areas [6]. 
These findings might be objective evidence of a potential pain perception capacity in MCS 
patients, which supports the idea that these patients need analgesic treatment. 
All these studies support the idea of probing sensory brain areas but also higher cognitive 
networks with a hierarchical approach.  Owen and Coleman [33] suggested to probe the auditory 
system with fMRI for its understanding of speech from basic to complex sentences (e.g., 
semantic ambiguity testing). Correspondingly, Kubler and Kotchoubey [22] proposed a five-
stage assessment involving resting EEG, passive stimulation (e.g., a standard oddball paradigm), 
stimulation following simple instructions, volitional tasks, and decision making with a brain-
computer interface (BCI). The last two levels are based on active responses and BCI and will be 
discussed in the next sections.  
Nowadays, we do not know if these early signs of higher cortical activity could be seen as 
prognosis or diagnosis markers. In the former case, not enough patients have been probed yet to 
infer the higher activation as a good prognosis of a further evolution from VS to MCS [11], or 
from MCS to emergence. In the latter case, it is too early to see these early neurological signs as 
new diagnostic marker. 
Resting state 
The study of the brain‘s activity in ‗resting state‘ has emerged as a new way to probe brain 
functional connectivity. Over the last years, increasing attention has been paid to the study of 
spontaneous brain activity and its significance for cognition and behaviour [37]. In particular, the 
concept of a ‗default mode of brain function‘ was introduced by Raichle et al. [38], after 
observing that a number of areas including the precuneus, bilateral temporoparietal junctions and 
medial prefrontal cortex, were more active at rest than when healthy subjects were involved in an 
attention-demanding cognitive task. This network of areas is now commonly referred to as the 
‗default network‘. Though its functional significance remains a matter of debate, it has been 
suggested as a candidate for the network subserving basic functions related to consciousness [7, 
17]. Other networks are reliably found in healthy controls and are related to known brain 
systems. : e.g., the extrinsic, salience, executive, auditory or visual networks. Of potential major 
interest from a clinical perspective is that resting state fMRI acquisitions do not require the 
patients‘ collaboration, and are easier to perform compared to the classical task-based fMRI 
paradigms described above. Boly and colleagues have recently studied such spontaneous 
activation in patients with DOCs showing that default network connectivity was decreased in 
severely brain-damaged patients in proportion to their degree of consciousness impairment, 
ranging from healthy controls and Locked-in syndrome, to minimally conscious, vegetative and 
comatose patients [8, 52] . Furthermore, precuneus connectivity was found to be significantly 
stronger in minimally conscious patients compared to vegetative state patients.  
Active neuroimaging 
The border between VS and MCS is defined by the presence of ‗voluntary‘ movements (e.g. eye 
tracking [50]) and the ability to respond to command in an inconsistent but reproducible way. In 
some patients, the recovery of consciousness could precede the motor recovery. For this reason, 
paradigms demanding active collaboration of the subject have been proposed. In ERP studies, 
selective attention could be translated in the appearance of a P3 wave or in an increase of 
amplitude of a P3 response. In a study where DOC patients were instructed to count their own 
name [43], the 14 studied MCS patients presented a larger P3 to the patient‘s own name while 
counting than while just listening to the target, similar to results obtained in controls. In contrast, 
no differences in P3 waves between passive and active conditions were observed for VS patients. 
In another experiment [3], an auditory paradigm evaluated cerebral responses to violations of 
temporal regularities that were either local in time, or global across several seconds. In controls, 
local violations led to an early response in auditory cortex, independent of attention, while global 
violations led to a late and spatially distributed response that was only present when subjects 
were attentive and aware of the violations. When applied to 8 DOCs patients, only conscious 
individuals presented a measurable global effect. 
Similarly, in a fMRI paradigm based on mental imagery tasks, patients were instructed to 
imagine playing tennis or to walk through their house [4]. Despite the clinical diagnosis of VS, a 
patient who suffered a traumatic brain injury 5 months earlier showed brain activation similar to 
that of the control subjects for both tasks [34]. A few months after the study, the patient was also 
behaviorally recognized as MCS. With a comparable methodology but based on EMG, 
Bekinschtein and colleagues [2] investigated command following (i.e., ‗‗move your hand‘‘) 
while recording EMG activity in eight VS patients. In one such patient, significant command 
related sub-behavioral threshold EMG changes could be demonstrated.  
The results of these studies should not be misinterpreted as evidence that all patients in a VS may 
actually be conscious. We have not observed any similar signs of awareness in fMRI scans in a 
large cohort of VS patients studied at the University of Liège (Belgium). The most likely 
explanation of these results is that the patients were already beginning the transition to the MCS 
at the time of the experiment. These paradigms might be a useful method to pre-clinically 
recognize MCS–like cognitive processing in patients behaviorally classified as VS.  
Neuroimaging emergence of communication 
Emergence from MCS is characterized by the ability to exhibit functional interactive 
communication. Functional neuroimaging could help to distinguish LIS from VS but also to 
 
disentangle more complex cases of DOC. Brain-computer interface (BCI), based either on EEG 
[22] or on fMRI [46] have been proposed as the ultimate way to probe consciousness. A BCI is a 
device which allows the brain to communicate to the external world without using the traditional 
pathways (e.g., muscle or voice) [58]. The neural activity of the brain is acquired, processed and 
transformed into a simple command (e.g., yes/no). BCI is a growing field of research based on 
EEG or fMRI but also intracranial electrodes. Nowadays BCIs work on detecting brain activity 
generated either by concentrating on a task (e.g., imagination/intention of movements, word task, 
etc.) or in response to external stimuli (e.g., event-related potential, steady-state visually-evoked 
potential). BCIs have been tested on patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and LIS 
with some success [21].  A BCI developed to work with DOCs should take into account the 
possibly highly fluctuating state of these patients and their tiredness. Demanding tasks, either too 
long or requiring too much concentration should be avoided. One way to address this problem is 
the continuation of the work initiated by Bekinschtein and colleagues based on detecting 
subthreshold EMG activity [2].  
Conclusion 
In clinical practice, the misdiagnosis of DOC patients is still frequent despite the introduction of 
diagnostic criteria and the development of appropriate scales (e.g., the Coma Recovery Scale-
Revised) to assess the patient‘s level and content of consciousness. Conscious patients can 
indeed be misdiagnosed as vegetative if they have severe near-complete motor impairment or if 
voluntary movements are erroneously interpreted as reflexes. Standardized behavioral scales and 
quantitative individual assessments should therefore be employed repetitively in the clinical 
routine by trained medical staff, in order to minimize the risk of erroneous diagnosis. 
Technological advances in neuroimaging allow us to increase our understanding of the human 
brain and this knowledge can be exploited in order to develop new diagnostic and prognostic 
approaches. Studies have shown that a typical VS is characterized by a functional cortical 
disconnection syndrome. Only primary cortices seem to be activated but are disconnected from 
the frontoparietal ―higher order‖ cortical network. In the MCS however, the latter areas can be 
activated and engaged at the lowest level of consciousness. However some vegetative patients 
have shown activation patterns similar to the ones observed in MCS. Is this enough to change 
their clinical diagnosis? This question needs more investigation before evidence based answers 
can be provided to the medical community. Advanced diagnostic techniques based on mental 
imagery and on cognitive event-related potentials using active paradigms are currently being 
investigated. Techniques such as BCI  are expected to be clinically used as a diagnostic tool in 
order to differentiate between conscious and unconscious patients. 
DOC‘s patients, especially patients in VS, present important ethical and moral issues.  
For now, only clinical examinations can be taken into account when therapeutic decisions have 
to be made, even if sometimes fMRI, cognitive ERPs or PET data precede the results of clinical 
recovery. Those neuroimaging studies remain in the research field and the clinical application of 
these techniques still awaits validation from ongoing multi-centric cohort studies. However when 
those paraclinical examinations are available, they can provide additional information that can be 
used to better understand the patient‘s situation and outcome. We think that in the near future, 
multimodal approaches including bedside examination, electrophysiology and functional 
imaging techniques will be employed to assess and treat disorders of consciousness.  
Acknowledgments    
This research was funded by the Belgian National Funds for Scientific Research (FNRS), the 
European Commission (DISCOS, COST, Mindbridge, DECODER), the James McDonnell 
Foundation, the Mind Science Foundation, the French Speaking Community Concerted Research 
Action, the Foundation Médicale Reine Elisabeth and the University of Liège. 
 
[1] Medical aspects of the persistent vegetative state (1). The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, N 
Engl J Med 330 (1994) 1499-1508. 
[2] T.A. Bekinschtein, M.R. Coleman, J. Niklison, 3rd, J.D. Pickard, F.F. Manes, Can electromyography 
objectively detect voluntary movement in disorders of consciousness?, J Neurol Neurosurg 
Psychiatry 79 (2008) 826-828. 
[3] T.A. Bekinschtein, S. Dehaene, B. Rohaut, F. Tadel, L. Cohen, L. Naccache, Neural signature of the 
conscious processing of auditory regularities, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 106 (2009) 1672-1677. 
[4] M. Boly, M.R. Coleman, M.H. Davis, A. Hampshire, D. Bor, G. Moonen, P.A. Maquet, J.D. Pickard, 
S. Laureys, A.M. Owen, When thoughts become action: an fMRI paradigm to study volitional 
brain activity in non-communicative brain injured patients, Neuroimage 36 (2007) 979-992. 
[5] M. Boly, M.E. Faymonville, P. Peigneux, B. Lambermont, F. Damas, A. Luxen, M. Lamy, G. 
Moonen, P. Maquet, S. Laureys, Cerebral processing of auditory and noxious stimuli in severely 
brain injured patients: differences between VS and MCS, Neuropsychol Rehabil 15 (2005) 283-
289. 
[6] M. Boly, M.E. Faymonville, C. Schnakers, P. Peigneux, B. Lambermont, C. Phillips, P. Lancellotti, 
A. Luxen, M. Lamy, G. Moonen, P. Maquet, S. Laureys, Perception of pain in the minimally 
conscious state with PET activation: an observational study, Lancet Neurol 7 (2008) 1013-1020. 
[7] M. Boly, C. Phillips, L. Tshibanda, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, M. Schabus, T.T. Dang-Vu, G. Moonen, R. 
Hustinx, P. Maquet, S. Laureys, Intrinsic brain activity in altered states of consciousness: how 
conscious is the default mode of brain function?, Ann N Y Acad Sci 1129 (2008) 119-129. 
[8] M. Boly, L. Tshibanda, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, Q. Noirhomme, C. Schnakers, D. Ledoux, P. 
Boveroux, C. Garweg, B. Lambermont, C. Phillips, A. Luxen, G. Moonen, C. Bassetti, P. Maquet, S. 
Laureys, Functional connectivity in the default network during resting state is preserved in a 
vegetative but not in a brain dead patient, Hum Brain Mapp 30 (2009) 2393-2400. 
[9] J.D. Born, A. Albert, P. Hans, J. Bonnal, Relative prognostic value of best motor response and 
brain stem reflexes in patients with severe head injury, Neurosurgery 16 (1985) 595-601. 
[10] M.R. Coleman, J.M. Rodd, M.H. Davis, I.S. Johnsrude, D.K. Menon, J.D. Pickard, A.M. Owen, Do 
vegetative patients retain aspects of language comprehension? Evidence from fMRI, Brain 130 
(2007) 2494-2507. 
[11] H. Di, M. Boly, X. Weng, D. Ledoux, S. Laureys, Neuroimaging activation studies in the vegetative 
state: predictors of recovery?, Clin Med 8 (2008) 502-507. 
[12] H.B. Di, S.M. Yu, X.C. Weng, S. Laureys, D. Yu, J.Q. Li, P.M. Qin, Y.H. Zhu, S.Z. Zhang, Y.Z. Chen, 
Cerebral response to patient's own name in the vegetative and minimally conscious states, 
Neurology 68 (2007) 895-899. 
[13] D. Galanaud, L. Naccache, L. Puybasset, Exploring impaired consciousness: the MRI approach, 
Curr Opin Neurol 20 (2007) 627-631. 
[14] J.T. Giacino, S. Ashwal, N. Childs, R. Cranford, B. Jennett, D.I. Katz, J.P. Kelly, J.H. Rosenberg, J. 
Whyte, R.D. Zafonte, N.D. Zasler, The minimally conscious state: definition and diagnostic 
criteria, Neurology 58 (2002) 349-353. 
[15] J.T. Giacino, J. Hirsch, N. Schiff, S. Laureys, Functional neuroimaging applications for assessment 
and rehabilitation planning in patients with disorders of consciousness, Arch Phys Med Rehabil 
87 (2006) S67-76. 
[16] J.T. Giacino, K. Kalmar, J. Whyte, The JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised: measurement 
characteristics and diagnostic utility, Arch Phys Med Rehabil 85 (2004) 2020-2029. 
[17] M.D. Greicius, V. Kiviniemi, O. Tervonen, V. Vainionpaa, S. Alahuhta, A.L. Reiss, V. Menon, 
Persistent default-mode network connectivity during light sedation, Hum Brain Mapp 29 (2008) 
839-847. 
[18] B. Jennett, F. Plum, Persistent vegetative state after brain damage, RN 35 (1972) ICU1-4. 
[19] B. Kotchoubey, Event-related potential measures of consciousness: two equations with three 
unknowns, Prog Brain Res 150 (2005) 427-444. 
[20] B. Kotchoubey, S. Lang, G. Mezger, D. Schmalohr, M. Schneck, A. Semmler, V. Bostanov, N. 
Birbaumer, Information processing in severe disorders of consciousness: vegetative state and 
minimally conscious state, Clin Neurophysiol 116 (2005) 2441-2453. 
[21] A. Kubler, N. Birbaumer, Brain-computer interfaces and communication in paralysis: extinction 
of goal directed thinking in completely paralysed patients?, Clin Neurophysiol 119 (2008) 2658-
2666. 
[22] A. Kubler, B. Kotchoubey, Brain-computer interfaces in the continuum of consciousness, Curr 
Opin Neurol 20 (2007) 643-649. 
[23] S. Laureys, The neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative state, Trends 
Cogn Sci 9 (2005) 556-559. 
[24] S. Laureys, Science and society: death, unconsciousness and the brain, Nat Rev Neurosci 6 
(2005) 899-909. 
[25] S. Laureys, M. Boly, P. Maquet, Tracking the recovery of consciousness from coma, J Clin Invest 
116 (2006) 1823-1825. 
[26] S. Laureys, M.E. Faymonville, P. Peigneux, P. Damas, B. Lambermont, G. Del Fiore, C. Degueldre, 
J. Aerts, A. Luxen, G. Franck, M. Lamy, G. Moonen, P. Maquet, Cortical processing of noxious 
somatosensory stimuli in the persistent vegetative state, Neuroimage 17 (2002) 732-741. 
[27] S. Laureys, S. Goldman, C. Phillips, P. Van Bogaert, J. Aerts, A. Luxen, G. Franck, P. Maquet, 
Impaired effective cortical connectivity in vegetative state: preliminary investigation using PET, 
Neuroimage 9 (1999) 377-382. 
[28] S. Laureys, C. Lemaire, P. Maquet, C. Phillips, G. Franck, Cerebral metabolism during vegetative 
state and after recovery to consciousness, J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 67 (1999) 121. 
[29] S. Laureys, F. Perrin, M.E. Faymonville, C. Schnakers, M. Boly, V. Bartsch, S. Majerus, G. Moonen, 
P. Maquet, Cerebral processing in the minimally conscious state, Neurology 63 (2004) 916-918. 
[30] S. Majerus, H. Gill-Thwaites, K. Andrews, S. Laureys, Behavioral evaluation of consciousness in 
severe brain damage, Prog Brain Res 150 (2005) 397-413. 
[31] P. Maquet, Positron emission tomography studies of sleep and sleep disorders, J Neurol 244 
(1997) S23-28. 
[32] Q. Noirhomme, M. Boly, V. Bonhomme, P. Boveroux, C. Philipps, P. Peigneux, A. Soddu, A. 
Luxen, G. Moonen, P. Maquet, S. Laureys, Bispectral Index correlates with regional cerebral 
blood flow during sleep in distinct cortical and subcortical structures in humans, Archives 
Italiennes de Biologie 147 (2009) 51-57. 
[33] A.M. Owen, M.R. Coleman, Functional neuroimaging of the vegetative state, Nat Rev Neurosci 9 
(2008) 235-243. 
[34] A.M. Owen, M.R. Coleman, M. Boly, M.H. Davis, S. Laureys, J.D. Pickard, Detecting awareness in 
the vegetative state, Science 313 (2006) 1402. 
[35] F. Perrin, C. Schnakers, M. Schabus, C. Degueldre, S. Goldman, S. Bredart, M.E. Faymonville, M. 
Lamy, G. Moonen, A. Luxen, P. Maquet, S. Laureys, Brain response to one's own name in 
vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome, Arch Neurol 63 (2006) 562-
569. 
[36] F. Plum, Posner, J.B., The diagnosis of stupor and coma., Davis FA, Philadelphia, 1966. 
[37] M.E. Raichle, Neuroscience. The brain's dark energy, Science 314 (2006) 1249-1250. 
[38] M.E. Raichle, A.M. MacLeod, A.Z. Snyder, W.J. Powers, D.A. Gusnard, G.L. Shulman, A default 
mode of brain function, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 98 (2001) 676-682. 
[39] N.D. Schiff, U. Ribary, D.R. Moreno, B. Beattie, E. Kronberg, R. Blasberg, J. Giacino, C. McCagg, 
J.J. Fins, R. Llinas, F. Plum, Residual cerebral activity and behavioural fragments can remain in 
the persistently vegetative brain, Brain 125 (2002) 1210-1234. 
[40] N.D. Schiff, D. Rodriguez-Moreno, A. Kamal, K.H. Kim, J.T. Giacino, F. Plum, J. Hirsch, fMRI 
reveals large-scale network activation in minimally conscious patients, Neurology 64 (2005) 514-
523. 
[41] C. Schnakers, D. Ledoux, S. Majerus, P. Damas, F. Damas, B. Lambermont, M. Lamy, M. Boly, A. 
Vanhaudenhuyse, G. Moonen, S. Laureys, Diagnostic and prognostic use of bispectral index in 
coma, vegetative state and related disorders, Brain Inj 22 (2008) 926-931. 
[42] C. Schnakers, S. Majerus, S. Laureys, Bispectral analysis of electroencephalogram signals during 
recovery from coma: preliminary findings, Neuropsychol Rehabil 15 (2005) 381-388. 
[43] C. Schnakers, F. Perrin, M. Schabus, S. Majerus, D. Ledoux, P. Damas, M. Boly, A. 
Vanhaudenhuyse, M.A. Bruno, G. Moonen, S. Laureys, Voluntary brain processing in disorders of 
consciousness, Neurology 71 (2008) 1614-1620. 
[44] C. Schnakers, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, J. Giacino, M. Ventura, M. Boly, S. Majerus, G. Moonen, S. 
Laureys, Diagnostic accuracy of the vegetative and minimally conscious state: Clinical consensus 
versus standardized neurobehavioral assessment, BMC Neurology (in press). 
[45] A. Shiel, S.A. Horn, B.A. Wilson, M.J. Watson, M.J. Campbell, D.L. McLellan, The Wessex Head 
Injury Matrix (WHIM) main scale: a preliminary report on a scale to assess and monitor patient 
recovery after severe head injury, Clin Rehabil 14 (2000) 408-416. 
[46] B. Sorger, B. Dahmen, J. Reithler, O. Gosseries, A. Maudoux, S. Laureys, R. Goebel, Another kind 
of ‘BOLD response’: Answering multiple-choice questions via online decoded single-trial brain 
signals, Prog Brain Res (accepted for publication). 
[47] M. Struys, L. Versichelen, E. Mortier, D. Ryckaert, J.C. De Mey, C. De Deyne, G. Rolly, Comparison 
of spontaneous frontal EMG, EEG power spectrum and bispectral index to monitor propofol 
drug effect and emergence, Acta Anaesthesiol Scand 42 (1998) 628-636. 
[48] G. Teasdale, B. Jennett, Assessment of coma and impaired consciousness. A practical scale, 
Lancet 2 (1974) 81-84. 
[49] L. Tshibanda, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, D. Galanaud, M. Boly, S. Laureys, L. Puybasset, Magnetic 
Resonance Spectroscopy and Diffusion Tensor Imaging in coma survivors: promises and pitfalls, 
Prog Brain Res (in press). 
[50] A. Vanhaudenhuyse, J. Giacino, C. Schnakers, K. Kalmar, C. Smart, M.A. Bruno, O. Gosseries, G. 
Moonen, S. Laureys, Blink to visual threat does not herald consciousness in the vegetative state, 
Neurology 71 (2008) 1374-1375. 
[51] A. Vanhaudenhuyse, S. Laureys, F. Perrin, Cognitive event-related potentials in comatose and 
post-comatose states, Neurocrit Care 8 (2008) 262-270. 
[52] A. Vanhaudenhuyse, Q. Noirhomme, L. Tshibanda, M.-A. Bruno, P. Boveroux, C. Schnakers, A. 
Soddu, V. Perlbarg, D. Ledoux, J.-F. Brichant, G. Moonen, P. Maquet, M. Greicius, S. Laureys, M. 
Boly, Default network connectivity reflects the level of consciousness in non-communicative 
brain damaged patients,  (submitted). 
[53] A. Vanhaudenhuyse, C. Schnakers, S. Bredart, S. Laureys, Assessment of visual pursuit in post-
comatose states: use a mirror, J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 79 (2008) 223. 
[54] H. Viertio-Oja, V. Maja, M. Sarkela, P. Talja, N. Tenkanen, H. Tolvanen-Laakso, M. Paloheimo, A. 
Vakkuri, A. Yli-Hankala, P. Merilainen, Description of the Entropy algorithm as applied in the 
Datex-Ohmeda S/5 Entropy Module, Acta Anaesthesiol Scand 48 (2004) 154-161. 
[55] H.U. Voss, A.M. Uluc, J.P. Dyke, R. Watts, E.J. Kobylarz, B.D. McCandliss, L.A. Heier, B.J. Beattie, 
K.A. Hamacher, S. Vallabhajosula, S.J. Goldsmith, D. Ballon, J.T. Giacino, N.D. Schiff, Possible 
axonal regrowth in late recovery from the minimally conscious state, J Clin Invest 116 (2006) 
2005-2011. 
[56] E.F. Wijdicks, Minimally conscious state vs. persistent vegetative state: the case of Terry (Wallis) 
vs. the case of Terri (Schiavo), Mayo Clin Proc 81 (2006) 1155-1158. 
[57] E.F. Wijdicks, W.R. Bamlet, B.V. Maramattom, E.M. Manno, R.L. McClelland, Validation of a new 
coma scale: The FOUR score, Ann Neurol 58 (2005) 585-593. 
[58] J.R. Wolpaw, N. Birbaumer, D.J. McFarland, G. Pfurtscheller, T.M. Vaughan, Brain-computer 






Figure 1. Illustration of the two major components of consciousness: the level of consciousness (i.e., 
arousal or wakefulness) and the content of consciousness (i.e., awareness) (Adapted from Laureys, 
2005). Physiological (sleep) and pharmacological (general anesthesia) modulation of arousal correlates 
with massive global decreases in cortical metabolism (in REM sleep metabolic activity is paradoxically 
prominent).  Behaviorally, the transition from coma to vegetative state is characterized by recovery of 
arousal (but the lack of awareness) .  The transition from vegetative to minimally conscious state is 
characterized by non-reflexive movements or command following and  emergence from the minimally 
conscious state is characterized by the ability to communicate New neuroimaging tools are offering 
better diagnostic and prognostic markers and EEG and fMRI paradigms are challenging the clinical 
borders of disorders of consciousness. 
 
